If member States decide to circumvent their international legal obligations by acting through a military operation led by an international organisation, the institutional veil of which provides a shield against their responsibility for possible wrongdoings, an accountability gap can be identified. The contribution explores one of the possibilities for addressing this gap, the prohibition of circumvention, as enshrined in Art. 61 DARIO. The provision stipulates the possibility to hold the troop contributing States accountable. However, arguably the problems with international organization's accountability gap cannot be solved in most cases by holding the States responsible over the actions of the MMO. Problematic appears such solution against the necessity to satisfy the thresholds of intent to circumvent and causing the organization to act in certain way, as required by the principle enshrined in the Article 61 DARIO.
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Introduction
Modern multinational military operations (MMOs) constitute a multifaceted phenomenon, with a variety of possible designs and plurality of actors involved. One common type of MMOs are operations conducted under the lead of international organizations, offering the benefit of being a platform for multiple states to combine their efforts and share burdens for often expensive and effortful military undertakings. 3 Such operations may give raise a variety of questions of international legal responsibility. As a matter of principle, the wrongdoings in operations led by international organisations are attributable primarily to the organisation itself. The implementation of responsibility of international organisations is however problematic, taking into consideration some of the de lege lata deficiencies of international law, such as in providing remedies to victims of international organizations´ wrongdoings 4 , lack of appropriate fora for bringing claims against international organizations, or the still prevalent absolute understanding of immunities of international organisations before national courts. The implementation problems create an accountability gap, which may be misused by troop contributing States (TCS) to avoid their own international obligations or, in case of breach of such obligations, their responsibility simply by "hiding" behind the legal veil of the organization leading the MMO.
The article explores one of the possibilities for addressing the accountability gap for MMO conduct, namely the possibility to hold the TCSs 5 responsible despite the conduct of the MMO is attributable to international organization. Such possibility is enshrined in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO), Article 61. 6 The provision contains prohibition of circumventing of obligations, the application of which would prohibit (troop contributing) states from using international organization for purposes of avoid-3 The term "Multinational Military Operations" refers for the purposes of this contribution to operations that are conducted under the lead of international organization, i.e. under the command and control of international organizations and where the organization bears primary responsibility over the conduct of the operation due being attributed the conduct of the operation. 4 BLOKKER, Niels. Member State Responsibility for Wrongdoings of International Organizations -Beacon of Hope or Delusion? International Organizations Law Review, 2015, vol. 12, pp. 319-332 (p. 320) . 5 Considerations in this contribution concern only TCSs, which are at the same time members of the organization. ing their international obligations. However, conditions for application of such principle, as enshrined in Art. 61 DARIO, are not settled. The prohibition of circumventing obligations has to be balanced between two competing ideas. Firstly, the separate legal personality of the international organization and the need for autonomy of the organization from TCSs´ interference must be protected. 7 On the other hand, TCSs cannot be allowed to escape their legal obligations by merely using international organizations "to do their dirty work". 8
This contribution argues that the criteria for extending the responsibility to troop contributing States in cases when the conduct is attributable to an international organization, must meet a relatively high threshold. Prohibition of circumvention can be understood as an exception to the principle 9 according to which membership of a State in an international organization alone cannot result into responsibility of such State for the conduct of the international organization. Consequently, due to the nature of the prohibition of circumvention as an exception, the required threshold should be high.
The article will in the first step provide an overview of the aspects creating the mosaic of the accountability gap and in the second step analyse DARIO Article 61 and its context as a possible answer to the problem. Third chapter will focus in two different aspects of the criteria for circumvention, namely the intent requirement, and requirement of TCS causing international organization to act. The provision of Article 61 DARIO will be analysed in the light of the European Court of Human Rights' (ECtHR) case law, which can be currently considered as being the sole proof of relevant practice. 10
The problem of an accountability gap
Separate legal personality of international organizations under international law creates an institutional veil. However, it is recognized that member States do not disappear behind this veil. Strict separation of legal personalities of international organization and TCSs would also not reflect the realities of organizations' decision-making process in practice. Since TCSs have wide array of mechanisms available to them for influencing the decision-making process, disregarding the member States behind the institutional veil of the organization is not possible. 11
The TCSs are represented in international organization's decision-making bodies and have final say in accepting orders through the chain of command regarding the conduct of their troops in the military operations. 12 The accountability gap occurs when TCSs rely on and hide behind the institutional veil to avoid their own international legal obligations or responsibility for wrongdoings. In the context of MMOs led by international organizations this can happen mainly in two ways.
First, the TCSs can act in a way and take an advantage of the fact that the conduct of a military operation is attributed solely to the organization 13 , which would not be a party to most treaties of international law (especially human rights treaties) that could limit the acceptable conduct of military operation. 14 The same problem can be raised regarding customary international law. Here the situation becomes even more complicated and the possibility for misuse broader. Not only it is questionable whether customary law is applicable to international organisations, but it would be difficult to establish which norms of customary international human rights law are applicable to the organization. 15 The TCS then could conduct the military operation without obeying its (treaty, customary or other 16 ) international obligations, availing itself of the separate legal personality of the international organization of which it is a member.
Second, the TCSs can take an advantage of the lack of enforcement mechanisms against international organizations. When breaches of international law are committed in the course of a military operation lead by an international organization, victims of such breaches often face difficulties with finding remedies against the organization. Currently, no international court has jurisdiction over international organizations. Moreover, immunity of international organizations before domestic courts constitutes an additional bar preventing victims 12 BARON, Wiebe. Command Responsibility in a Multinational Setting: How to Deal with Different Interpretations of International (Humanitarian) Law. Some Experiences from Practice. Military Law and Law of War Review, 2005, vol. 44, p. 142. 13 Dual or shared responsibility of international organisation and troop contributing states is possible, however so is the exclusive responsibility of international organisation. The base for determination of attribution, and consequently responsibility in case of violation of international law, is the proximity of an actor to a conduct, or, as Ryngaert notes, "the proximity of an actor to another actor to whom the wrongful conduct has been attributed (attribution of responsibility)"; RYNGAERT, The Responsibility of Member States of International Organizations, supra, p. 507. 14 DARIO and Commentaries, Commentary to Article 61, para. 9. 15 An additional layer of problem constitutes the fact that applicability of international human rights law to international organizations is limited by the virtue of basic principles governing life and existence of international organizations, such as the principle speciality, which in practice may limit the ability of an organization to fulfil the variety of specific obligations resulting from international human rights norms. 16 This includes particularly unilateral acts as a recognized source of international obligations.
to obtain justice. Certainly, it is expected that member States will exercise their powers within the international organization to prevent wrongful acts. Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that international law de lege lata is insufficient as it allows TCSs to use the international organization´s legal personality as a shield, creating in such a way what is referred to as the accountability gap.
Examples to illustrate the accountability gap can be found from the NATO's and United Nation's military and peacekeeping operations during the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Since the conduct of the military operation was attributed to the UN or the NATO, the TCSs were able to escape their human rights obligations under the ECHR. In the context of UNMIK, the operations would have violated the ECHR especially in detention issues if the conduct would have been attributed to the TCSs. 17 The ECtHR´s Saramati case highlighted the issue, as a victim of detention practice was left without legal remedies due to the attribution of the detention to UN, since the ECtHR found not having jurisdiction to decide about conduct, which in its opinion was attributable to the United Nations. 18 Similarly, in situations where MMO conduct amounts to violation of international law, both, the TCSs and the international organization might refuse to accept responsibility and argue instead another entity being responsible for the wrongful conduct 19 , as can be illustrated on the ECtHR´s Behrami Case. 20 The KFOR's failure to demine unexploded ordnances left by the earlier military actions caused death and injuries to children who were playing in the area. 21 However, similarly to the joined case of Saramati, ECtHR did not held the TCSs, which were exercising command and control of the area, responsible due to attributing the conduct of the KFOR to the UN. 22 The lack of remedy mechanisms and fora in response to wrongdoings committed during MMOs, and thus an accountability gap, arguably does exist not only at international level, but also in domestic courts. For example, in Mothers of Srebrenica Case 23 , the Netherlands courts have failed to bring remedies for victims of military operations due to attribution of conduct to an international organization. Consequently, one of the paths to closing the accountability gap would be attributing conduct or responsibility (also) to the TCSs rather than only to the international organization. 24
In search for the response: Article 61 DARIO
General accepted principle is that member States are not responsible over the conduct of the international organization based on their membership alone. 25 As such, the responsibility must be established by other ways, exploring the proximity of the States to the international organisation´s action going, whereas the proximity must go beyond the mere membership. The Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations list possible paths in its Part 5, namely aid and assistance, direction and control, coercion, circumvention and acceptance of responsibility (Articles 58-62). 26 However, for the purposes of the accountability gap explained above, most of the exceptions are not fruitful. Aid and assistance, direction and control, and coercion all require for the act to be internationally wrongful for both entities (although in the case of coercion the coercion itself would excuse the wrongfulness of the organization). 27 As such, the situation where TCS escapes its own obligations by taking an advantage of the fact that the international organization is not bound by it would not qualify. Therefore, Article 61 DARIO that prohibits circumvention seems most suitable to tackle the accountability gap as defined above. Article 61 DARIO states that: "A State member of an international organization incurs international responsibility if, by taking advantage of the fact that the organization has competence in relation to the subject-matter of one of the State's international obligations, it circumvents that obligation by causing the organization to commit an act that, if committed by the State, would have constituted a breach of the obligation. " 28
The threshold for holding a TCS responsible over international organization's conduct based on the prohibition of circumvention can be then divided into the following criteria: Firstly, organization must have competence in the subject matter where the TCS' obligation is being circumvented. 29 there should be little problems in military operations, as international organizations taking part in military operations clearly do have competence to do so. Secondly, the TCS must cause the international organization to act in certain way. 30 Thirdly, as the term "circumvent" implies, TCS must have certain intent to circumvent its obligations. 31
The specifics of the abovementioned requirements are not fully clarified and can be problematic. Stricter definitions of causation and intent can limit the possibility of using the principle of prohibition of circumvention to close the accountability gap. Last criterion concerns the breach of the obligation of the TCS. However, it is important to note that the conduct does not have to constitute a breach of international organization's legal obligations. 32 Therefore, even the conduct is legal for international organization, the TCS might still be held responsible over the conduct due to prohibition of circumvention.
The principle of prohibition of circumvention as introduced by Article 61 DARIO has been criticized for failing to cite State or organizational practice over its codification of the rules. 33 Nevertheless, the DARIO have been used in practice by international tribunals and can be taken the very least as guiding authoritative statements of the law. 34 Furthermore, even if the DARIO would not qualify as a codification of law as it currently stands de lege lata, it can serve as an authoritative statement of ILC and guiding assistance to the issue at hand. However, due to the unclear stance and its role as an exception to the general rule, certain interpretational restraint would be in order. Arguably, the troop contributing States´ responsibility over the conduct of international organization should not go as far as to threaten the fundamentals of the international law, such as the autonomy of international organizations. The autonomy would come under threat if the TCSs are forced to interfere with the organization's decisionmaking process over the risk of being responsible over the conduct of the organization.
The Commentary to Article 61 DARIO provides as example of relevant practice the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 35 However, arguably the DARIO approach and the ECtHR approach differ significantly. Therefore, even the DARIO commentary cites the ECtHR´s Bosphorus and Gasparini Cases, 36 Article 61, seems to be more related to the primary obligations arising from the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) instead of the secondary obligations of the responsibility of international organizations. 37 The applicable parts of the Bosphorus Case that DARIO commentary quotes, reflect more overall rule confirming the necessity to not to allow member States to escape their obligations by acting through an international organization in principle, not to claim mirroring standard for the criteria for circumvention in DARIO and ECtHR case law. 38 That is not to say that ECtHR case law would have no bearing to the DARIO system or to the specific question of TCS circumvention in MMO framework, but it can be argued that the ECtHR and DARIO approaches do not completely mirror each other.
The ECtHR case law regarding circumvention of obligations has been developed in cases that were not related to military operations. Indeed, ECtHR has been very reluctant to apply its jurisdiction to military operations, especially those authorized by UN, claiming that ECHR cannot be interpreted in a way as to "subject the acts and omissions of Contracting Parties which are covered by UNSC Resolutions and occur prior to or in the course of such missions, to the scrutiny of the Court. " 39 However, while that might be true for ECtHR and ECHR specifically, it is not clear if the same principle should be applied universally for UN operations, and secondly, if NATO or other international organizations would gain equivalent protection for their operations. The Behrami decision was based on the necessity to ensure the effective enforcement and implementation of UNSC actions and based on the fact that not all of the permanent members of the UNSC are subject to ECHR. 40 It would not, therefore, be necessary to generalize the decision to apply in all MMOs in all cases.
Circumvention
It requires further analysis, whether and under which conditions the principle enshrined in Article 61 DARIO could be applied to close the accountability gap in multinational military operations. The most significant challenges appear to stem from the requirements that the TCSs must have intention to circumvent the obligations and that the TCS must cause the international organization to act in certain way. This article argues that it is unlikely that TCSs would fulfil the threshold of circumvention and therefore be assigned responsibility over the conduct of the MMO. Circumvention would then be relevant only in situations where the TCS are completely dominating the decision making of the international organization to the extent that the organization could be claimed to have lost its autonomy.
Intent to circumvent
First aspect to be addressed is the need for intent for the TCS to circumvent its obligations. The DARIO commentary recognizes that there is a need for subjective element for circumvention. It claims that circumvention would not include cases where the circumvention is only "unintended result of the member State's conduct. " 41 At the same time it confirms that the circumvention is not limited only to the cases where the TCS would be abusing its rights. 42 However, the commentary fails to be more specific on this aspect. Some authors have been critical towards any subjective standard of circumvention, claiming that it is both too high standard to adequately managing the responsibility gap and furthermore does not have basis in the international law. 43 Alternatively authors argue that the DARIO Commentary claims that the intent to circumvent can be obtained from circumstances and not from hard evidence proving intent hints for "constructed knowledge test", where the TCS would face responsibility in case it fails to inquire whether the international organization's standards of law are dissimilar to those of the TCS. 44 That approach is supported by the ECtHR case law. According to the ECtHR in Gasparini Case, member States are under an obligation to see that the organization has "equivalent protection" of legal obligations as the member States do. 45 Indeed, the Gasparini Case fails to even analyse the intention for the member States to circumvent their obligations but merely attaches a positive duty to ensure that the protection is equivalent. Therefore, the standard for intent could be, on par with ECtHR case law, a "constructive knowledge", or in other words, the TCSs might be circumventing their obligations if they have failed to inquire whether the international organization's standards were adequately similar to those of TCS Nevertheless, that approach seems too loose for the DARIO. It runs largely counter to the commentary. 47 Completely objective standard would mean that TCSs would be responsible over organization's actions in every situation where they would have different legal obligations. 48 That clearly goes too far and would make the separate legal personalities of the international organization and its member States obsolete. Similarly, even the "constructed knowledge test" could run against the requirement for intent. Merely failing to ensure that the standards are similar does not mean that the TCS would have had the intent to circumvent its obligations by acting through an international organization. Failure to ensure the equivalent protection could still be unintended result of member States´ action. To require such standard could endanger the effective chain of command and cause too much TCSs´ interference with the MMO conduct. 49 Therefore, while the DARIO commentary cites the ECtHR case law, it does not necessarily mean that the approaches mirror or overlap each other (in full). The ECtHR case law can be taken as a precedence for stricter standard for member States´ responsibility in conduct related to ECHR specifically. Together with the reluctance of ECtHR to attribute responsibility to TCS in military operations the approach's effect on the question of TCS circumvention in MMO framework is seemingly very limited.
It has to be noted however that hard proof of intent of States is very difficult to attain in practice. 50 One could hardly find admissions of the TCSs' intent to circumvent their conduct through the international organization of which they are members. Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that the intent requirement has been lowered during ILC's drafting of the circumvention in DARIO. 51 Currently the intent to circumvent can seemingly be delivered from the circumstances without hard evidence of specific intent to circumvent. 52 Therefore, there should be more substantial actions to deliver the intent from the circumstances. It is important to note that too high standard for proving intent could easily make it nearly impossible to hold TCSs responsible for circumventing their obligations through international organisations. into account, possible motive for TCSs to circumvent obligations could serve as a starting point of proving intent. Similarly, TCSs' capabilities in influencing the MMO's conduct could assist in establishing possible proof of intent. If the TCSs´ ability to influence the MMO conduct is very limited, it could be more easily seen as unintended result and not as circumvention of obligations. Also carrying out conduct knowing that it would be illegal if done by the State, while alone would not fulfil the intent requirement, could serve as further indication for intent to circumvent. The ECOMOG military operation in Liberia could provide a suitable example. The military operation was formally under the control and authority of ECOWAS, 53 but was in practice dominated by Nigeria and its interests. 54 As such, it could be difficult to see how it would be merely unintended result if Nigeria decides to shield its responsibility and judicial review of its troops conduct by acting through ECOWAS established ECOMOG under its de facto command.
TCS causation of the international organizations' act
The intent is merely the first step in establishing circumvention and alone it is insufficient for concluding that the TCS circumvented its obligations in the understanding of Article 61 DARIO. The next aspect is the standard of causing the organization to act certain way. The causation is fundamental to the question of circumventing obligations in military operations since the TCSs reserve and retain certain discretionary rights and powers in all situations. Consequently, the question arises about the form and intensity of the exercised influence that the TCSs must have over the international organization and its conduct to establish the circumvention.
The DARIO commentary claims for need of existence of a "significant link" between the TCS and international organization, and that the act must be caused by the TCS. 55 An act would not be caused by a TCS if its influence would be limited or its behaviour mostly negative, i.e. if it could use negative vote to prevent a decision. The required standard of causation must go beyond the mere non-use of possibilities to prevent a conduct or participation in decision-making. usually retain the right to call back their troops and decline orders from international organization's chain of command, along with criminal and administrative jurisdiction over their troop contingents. 56 Would such possibility constitute a sufficient "causation link", then the causation would be given in almost every foreseeable scenario of MMOs. 57 Thus considering standard decision-making and voting procedures in international organizations, the standard influence which a TCS has in almost all MMOs seems to be not sufficient to fulfil the threshold.
Prime example of the negative influence of TCSs can be found from NATO operations. The NATO chain of command established the North Atlantic Council at its pinnacle, which sits the representatives of the member States. 58 Similarly, the positions lower in the chain of command also include TCSs´ personnel. 59 However, as indicated above, the causation link would not be fulfilled in such situations. The causation link should go further than that, arguably requiring dominant position of a TCS in a MMO framework, not a simple international organization's decision-making process where TCS hold much influence over the organization collectively as a group, such as in NATO. 60 Especially since the NATO member States´ influence is mostly negative, as the decisions must be done unanimously. 61 Single TCS can veto decisions, but it is difficult to impose one's own will to make the organization to take positive actions. Therefore, seemingly the domination must arrive outside the institutional rules of the organization, which is relatively high threshold to fulfil, even though not impossible.
Apparently, in ECOMOG operations the single TCS dominant position would have been fulfilled. The operations have been criticized for Nigeria's domination while the military operation was under (at least formally) ECOWAS chain of command, 62 and could therefore be considered as possible situations for circumvention.
The above analysis shows quite high requirement for TCS´s causation of international organization's conduct for the circumvention. If a TCS would fulfil the criteria analysed above, the TCS could be considered to be also in effective control of the MMO conduct. As such, the TCS would be already attributed the conduct, and therefore responsibility, of the MMO and the problems of accountability gap would not be relevant. However, in cases where the TCS´s influence happens in the organization's decision-making process (possibly strong arming or otherwise using extra-legal influencing during the organization's process) the effective control is still within the organization, as it is the organization's organs making the decisions, but the de facto domination of a TCS is enough to fulfil the criteria of causing the act of the international organization. Therefore, in the situations similar to the ECOMOG military operations, conduct could still be held attributable to the international organization but the TCS can be considered avoiding its legal obligations by using the organization and acting through it.
The ECtHR case law does not shed much light on the question of causation link and its required intensity. First, the ECtHR case law largely has ignored the question of dominant control position or significant link between the member States´ influence and international organizations' acts. The ECtHR has held in the Bosphorus Case that in order for the member State to be responsible for organization's acts there must be a State action. 63 However, this requirement has been relaxed later in ECtHR case law. 64 On the other hand, the Behrami and Saramati Cases' precedence of refusing to apply the circumvention to the UN MMO framework is fundamental here. The ECtHR justified its refusal by claiming that to do otherwise could endanger the effective conduct of the UNSC peace operations over TCS´s interven- tion. 65 However, such threats would not be present in cases where the TCSs are in a dominant position in influencing the conduct of the MMO as in case of the ECOMOG example. The organization does not need such protection against dominant TCS that already controls the organization and acts through it. 66 Therefore, when a TCS is in dominant position it seems reasonable not to protect the international organization´s autonomy against TCSs´ interventions, for the simple reason that the organization already has lost its autonomy over the dominant TCS control. 67 High threshold for fulfilment of the criteria for circumvention is logical to justify the DARIO regime's approach and its roots in possible customary law. Jurisprudence generally follows the approach of not obligating the member States to bear responsibility over the conduct of an international organization when the organization has a separate legal personality. 68 However, since the justification for such separation of legal personalities arises from the need to safeguard the autonomy of the organization against the member States' interference, it is reasonable to assume that the limits of the separation of legal personalities can be established to situations where the goals of that justification are no longer presented. DARIO criteria should be carefully interpreted in situations where the document is not clearly codifying customary law. Therefore, interpreting the prohibition of circumvention it in a way that would be least disturbing to the principles of law of international organizations should be deemed correct. The separation of legal personalities should not present obstacles of TCS's responsibility and applicability of their legal obligations to the MMO framework when the TCS already dominates the decision-making process and overcame the autonomy of the organization in effective control of the operation.
Similarly, the arguments that claim that such dampening of international organization's autonomy would hurt the organization's possibility of acting in a required way in MMO leadership position, as the TCS would intervene with the decision-making process to ensure that they would not be liable for damages are not necessarily realized. 69 The majority of IHL rules already have clauses that go beyond the rules of attribution 70 and the TCSs seem to attempt to control that their troops in the MMO missions do not violate their own obligations even when the conduct is attributed to the international organization. 71 Examples of this can be found in widely found "red card" procedures in MMO settings, where the TCS representative can veto orders from the organization's chain of command if they would conflict with the TCS legal obligations. 72 Furthermore, the individual soldiers in ground are bound by their own state's criminal law and are under its criminal jurisdiction, which can make the individual soldiers to be unable to take part in conduct that would not comply with their own state's international obligations.
The DARIO approach of circumvention does not support a wide approach to holding TCSs responsible over the conduct of international organization's military operations. Indeed, the separation of legal personalities of international organization and TCS is fundamental. Similarly, the policy arguments support the stricter separation of legal personalities. However, it is not completely impossible to hold TCSs responsible over the conduct of a MMO. TCS can attain responsibility based on circumvention of obligations in rare situations where the TCS dominates an international organization and uses it to escape its obligations. In such situations the high threshold of the intent and causation requirements can be fulfilled.
Conclusion
The article aimed at shedding more light at the possibility of holding TCS responsible of MMO conduct beyond the rules of attribution of conduct when circumventing their obligations by acting through an international organization and hiding behind its institutional veil. However, arguably the problems with international organization's accountability gap cannot be solved in most cases by holding the States responsible over the actions of the MMO. Problematic appears such solution against the necessity to satisfy the thresholds of intent to circumvent and causing the organization to act in certain way, as required by the principle enshrined in the Article 61 DARIO. Firstly, it is difficult to prove intent in practice. However, factors such as possible motive for TCS to circumvent obligations and TCS's influence it can exercise in the MMO framework could assist in delivering the possible proof of intent. If the TCS seemingly lack the need and ability to influence the MMO conduct, it could serve as evidence for the TCS avoidance being unintended result of its actions and therefore would not fulfil the threshold of Article 61 DARIO. Also the requirement of causing international organization to act in certain way should be constructed with a high threshold. The high threshold is justified due to the role of Article 61 DARIO being an exception to the general principle of entities being responsible for their own conduct and member States would not incur responsibility over the international organization automatically. 73 However, the purpose of the strict separation of entities, based on their separate legal personality under international law, is to ensure the autonomy of the international organization. If one would compel TCSs to be responsible over the international organization's military operation, it would ruin the effective command structure of the operation and would make the TCS interfere with the chain of command. However, if a TCS, due to its domination of the international organization and the military operation, would have dismantled the organization's autonomy already, there would be no need to try to protect it for the simple reason that it is already gone. While it is a rare occurrence, arguably Nigerian domination over ECOMOG operations could serve as an example of situations where the circumvention is applicable.
